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ABSTRACT 
 
ANNDAL NARAYANAN:  Le silence de la guerre?  French combatants' memoirs of the 
Algerian War, 1954-1988 
(Under the direction of Donald Reid) 
 
 
 
Fifty years after the cessation of hostilities, the memory of the Algerian War of 
Independence (1954-1962) remains an open wound in French society.  From the time of 
the war itself, French veterans of Algeria sought to find their voice in a society largely 
indifferent to them and their experiences.  This thesis examines the evolving memory of 
the Algerian War among French veterans who wrote wartime memoirs, and seeks the 
relationship of these narratives with the wider French collective memory of the Algerian 
War, by closely following the constructed figure of the combatant.  This study finds that 
French veterans' narratives of Algeria, while all expressing various kinds of victimhood, 
evolved in time from the political to the personal, encouraged by governmental amnesties 
that depoliticized the memory of the war and contributed to the impossibility of a general 
collective memory of the Algerian War in France.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Silence was inscribed in the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) from its 
outset, profoundly affecting those who fought it.  This war pitted the Algerian nationalist 
front group Front de libération nationale (FLN) and its Armée de libération nationale 
(ALN) against French forces, in a settler colony comprised of some one million 
European-origin colonists and almost 9.5 million native Algerians.1   After two years of 
“operations to maintain order,” conscripts were deployed in 1956, their mission termed 
“pacification.”  About 1.2 million French youth were added to an army of professional 
soldiers, many of whom had fought in World War II and Indochina (1948-1954), and 
some of whom had been in the Resistance2.  The conscripts, on the other hand, 4.6% of 
the total French population, were chiefly from the generation which grew up after World 
War II; many were either newlyweds or still lived with their parents3.  Conscripts and 
career soldiers alike returned to an indifferent Metropole that was eager to avoid 
confronting another national disgrace after the German occupation and the recent loss of 
Indochina in 1954.  Without the mass demobilizations and return rituals following the 
                                                 
1Daniel Lefeuvre, “Les pieds-noirs,” 267-285 in Mohammed Harbi and Benjamin Stora, eds., La guerre 
d'Algérie, 1954-2004: la fin de l'amnésie (Paris:  Laffont, 2004), 267. 
 
2Raphaëlle Branche, “La dernière génération du feu?  Jalons pour une étude des anciens combattants 
français de la guerre d'Algérie,” Politique, culture, société 3, (Nov.-Dec. 2007), <http://www.histoire-
politique.fr> (5 February 2011), 2, and Benjamin Stora, La gangrène et l'oubli: la mémoire de la guerre 
d'Algérie (Paris:  Découverte, 1989), 73. 
 
3Stora, La gangrène, 293, and Raphaëlle Branche, “Clementines et bifteck, ou le retour d'un appélé 
d'Algérie vu par ses frères et soeurs,” 67-81 in dir. Bruno Cabanes and Guillaume Piketty, Retour à 
l'intime: au sortir de la guerre, (Paris:  Tallandier, 2009), 67. 
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World Wars, veterans of Algeria were rendered invisible in a way that previous veterans 
in France never were, and this was the first layer of silence built around their experience.4   
Returning from a war without a name to a rapidly changing society often reluctant to 
listen to them, French veterans of the Algerian war struggled to find their voice.    
 
   In the decades after the official end of hostilities in 1962, manifold levels of 
silence enclosed the public memory of the war.  Indeed, only in the mid-1990s did French 
political leaders dare to utter the word “war” in relation to what had been known as “the 
events of North Africa,” and it was not until 1999 that the National Assembly officially 
named the conflict in legislative texts as the “Algerian war.”5  The eminent historian of 
Algeria, Benjamin Stora—from a Jewish Algerian family which left Constantine after the 
war—identified the refoulement (repression) of the war's memory in French society in his 
seminal work La gangrène et l'oubli: la mémoire de la guerre d'Algérie.  Stora argues 
that the French Fifth Republic was ashamed of its birth from chaos—the result of a right-
wing military coup in Algiers in 1958—and its associations with colonialism.  Therefore, 
President Charles de Gaulle redirected the Fifth Republic's gaze to its own mythical 
origins, commemorating the Resistance and refusing to acknowledge the Indochina or 
Algerian wars.6  Moreover, Stora argues that amnesties of crimes during the war, 
beginning with those proclaimed in the Accords of Évian of March 18, 1962, and 
continuing through 1981, obscured contentious memories of the war “in a climate of 
                                                 
4Branche, “Clémentines et bifteck,” 67. 
5Mohand Hamoumou and Abderahmen Moumen, “L'histoire des harkis et Français musulmans:  la fin d'un 
tabou?" 317-344 in Mohammed Harbi and Benjamin Stora, La guerre d'Algérie, 1954-2004: la fin de 
l'amnésie? (Paris:  Laffont, 2004), 317. 
 
6Stora, La gangrène, 221. 
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indifference”.7  Because of this public climate, there was no possibility for a single 
French collective memory of the Algerian war.8    
 However, a large body of writing on the Algerian War has emerged in the decades 
after 1962.  Alongside a majority of works by civilians expressing nostalgia for l'Algérie 
française, a diverse range of French veterans wrote memoirs reflecting on the methods 
and meaning of the war.9  Historians have used these works to study the operational 
history of the war; however, there has not been a significant study of these veterans' 
memoirs as products of the eras when they were written.  These sources present an 
important site to examine the relationship between collective and individual memories, 
and to trace the ways that the Algerian War was remembered, by those who fought it. 
 This study situates itself in this ellipsis:  what memory did French veterans 
develop of this war, beneath a general public atmosphere of silence and indifference?  
More specifically, how did veterans construct their identities as anciens combattants 
through memoirs of their experiences?  Finally, what is the relationship between the 
narratives put forth by veterans, and the contentious and fractured French collective 
memory of the Algerian war?  My findings accord generally with Benjamin Stora's 
chronology of the repression of collective memory of the war from public space in 
France.  However, if we examine this chronology specifically through the lens of 
veterans' memoirs, the picture becomes more complex.   
 This study follows the figure of the combatant in memoirs as a vehicle for 
conveying the meaning of the French experience in the Algerian War.  It demonstrates 
                                                 
7Stora, La gangrène et l'oubli, 215. 
8Ibid., 242. 
9Stora notes that almost 70% of all literature published on the war between 1962 and 1982 is pro-Algérie 
française.  Ibid., 238. 
   
  4 
that during and immediately after the war, mutually exclusive visions of the war in 
combatants' memoirs competed for entry into French collective memory, but that the 
state's amnesties of crimes during the war (particularly in 1968, 1974, and 1981) 
gradually decreased the impetus for individualistic political stances on the darkest aspects 
of the war.  Therefore the early memoirs are fiercely partisan and unabashedly political, 
but later memoirs increasingly take a more personal stance, speaking from within 
particular memory communities.  From 1954 to 1988, the evolving figure of the ancien 
d'Algérie in veterans' memoirs both reflects the gradual erection of official silences 
around the war through amnesties, and manifests a consistent sense of victimhood, the 
only 'lesson' that could be shared among mutually incompatible views of the war.  
 
 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 
 The literature on the memory of the Algerian War forms the essential background 
of this study.  Benjamin Stora is the foremost French historian of the Algerian war and its 
memory; his work La gangrène et l'oubli: la mémoire de la guerre d'Algérie traces the 
willful forgetting of the war by the French public and especially French politicians.  This 
seminal work encouraged scholars such as Claire Mauss-Copeaux to pierce through the 
silence surrounding veterans: her oral microhistory of veterans from the Vosges region, 
Appelés en Algérie: la parole confisquée, demonstrates that regardless of veterans' 
political views on the Algerian War, their regional collective memory of the Occupation 
and Resistance framed their memory of combat in Algeria more than the colonial culture 
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in which they were raised.10  Moreover, Mauss-Copeaux notes the dearth of memoirs 
written by ordinary conscripts, as opposed to officers or career soldiers.11   
 Other scholars, such as Mohand Hamoumou and Jean-Jacques Jordi, have studied 
the memory of those whose stories were excluded by the general French refoulement of 
the Algerian years, in particular those known as Français musulmans.12  These were men 
of North African descent who fought for France, estimated at 263,000 total comprising 
20,000 regulars, 40,000 conscripts, and 58,000 harkis (supplementary local self-defense 
units).13  Several tens of thousands of Français musulmans left in Algeria by explicit 
order of the French Fifth Republic would be massacred by the FLN after the war, and 
those who were able to flee to France were often confined to resettlement camps.14  
Arguably, despite its mistreatment and neglect by the French state, this community, as a 
group, has become more visible in French historical memory of the war than have 
European-origin veterans; the literature these combatants produced merits another study 
by itself, which will not be attempted here. 
 Since the turn of the twenty-first century, a new generation of historians has 
broached the topic of the memory of the Algerian war in particular.15   A cascade of events 
in the French public forum beginning in 2000 triggered renewed historical scrutiny of the 
                                                 
10Claire Mauss-Copeaux, Appelés en Algérie: la parole confisquée (Paris:  Hachette, 1998), 278. 
 
11Ibid., 9. 
 
12Mohand Hamoumou, Et ils sont devenus harkis (Paris:  Fayard, 1993), and Jean-Jacques Jordi and 
Mohand Hamoumou, Les harkis, une mémoire enfouie (Paris:  Autrement, 1999). 
 
13Benjamin Stora, Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie (1954-1962), (Paris:  Découverte, 1993), 80.  
Francophone and Anglophone scholars frequently use the term harkis as shorthand for the ensemble of 
native Algerians who fought on the side of France during the war. 
 
14Stora, La gangrène et l'oubli, 85. 
 
15Alec G. Hargreaves, “France and Algeria, 1962-2002:  turning the page?” Modern and Contemporary 
France 10 (4), 2002:  445-447, 445. 
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war on that side of the Mediterranean.  In June 2000, Le Monde published an interview 
with an Algerian woman, Louise Ighilariz, who had been tortured and raped by French 
paratroopers, and in November, General Paul Aussaresses gave an unrepentant interview 
to the same newspaper, defending the necessity of torture and acknowledging the 
summary executions he committed.16  Stéphane Gacon's L'Amnestie: De la Commune à 
la guerre d'Algérie reflects a reinvigorated scholarly inquiry into war crimes of Algeria.  
This thoughtful work argues that the French state has employed amnesties to consolidate 
centralized power and to forget the past enough to move beyond national ruptures, a 
theory which greatly inspires the analysis in this thesis.17  Raphaëlle Branche's La guerre 
d'Algérie: une histoire apaisée? adeptly outlines the political and institutional bases of 
the forgetting of the war that Stora identified through the 1960s and 1970s, but also 
demonstrates the subsequent reappearance of this subject in French consciousness 
beginning in the 1980s.   Mohammed Harbi and Benjamin Stora compiled one of the 
most comprehensive recent works on the memory of the war, La guerre d'Algérie, 1954-
2004: la fin de l'amnésie?, which presents studies by leading French and Algerian 
historians and literary critics.18  This volume emphasizes the experiences of harkis, the 
FLN, anti-colonialist activists, and the pieds noirs, European-origin settlers in Algeria, all 
of whom were given French citizenship in 1889.19  
                                                 
16William B. Cohen, “The Sudden Memory of Torture:  The Algerian War in French Discourse, 2000-
2001,” French Politics, Culture & Society 19 (3), Fall 2001:  82-94, 87.     
 
17Stéphane Gacon, L’Amnistie: de la Commune à la guerre d’Algérie (Paris:  Seuil, 2002). 
 
18Mohammed Harbi and Benjamin Stora, eds., La guerre d'Algérie, 1954-2004: la fin de l'amnésie (Paris:  
Laffont, 2004). 
 
19David Prochaska, Making Algeria French:  Colonialism in Bône, 1870-1920 (Cambridge:  Cambridge UP, 
1990), 146. 
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 However, historical research principally on the veterans of the Algerian War 
themselves is “practically nonexistent,” according to Raphaëlle Branche, one of the only 
French historians to have undertaken such work.
20
  Her article, “La dernière génération 
du feu? Jalons pour une étude des anciens combattants français de la guerre d'Algérie,” 
calls for studies of veterans' postwar experiences, which remains a largely unexplored 
field.  Foremost among this scant research is a study of the trauma and shame which the 
war engendered in some soldiers, psychiatrist Bernard Sigg's Le silence et la honte:  
névroses de la guerre d'Algérie.
21
  This important work argues that the thesis of "oubli" 
and "refoulement" does not explain the memory of the Algerian War among its veterans; 
rather "censorship or self-censorship" has been at work.
22
  One of the most important 
works about the experiences of soldiers during and after their service is Soldats en 
Algérie, 1954-1962:  expériences contrastées des hommes du contingent  by Jean-Charles 
Jauffret.
23
  Another excellent study is The Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-
1962: Experiences, Images, Testimonies, edited by Martin S. Alexander, Martin Evans, 
and J. F. V. Keiger.
24
  Denouncing the “Manichaean perspective [which...] has framed the 
great bulk of writing on the Algerian War and the French Army,” this edited volume 
seeks to “dissolve myths and misleading simplistic images” of both French soldiers as 
                                                 
20Branche, “La dernière génération du feu?”, 3. 
 
21Bernard Sigg, Le silence et la honte:  névroses de la guerre d'Algérie (Paris:  Messidor, 1989). 
 
22Ibid., 25.  
 
23Jean-Charles Jauffret, Soldats en Algérie 1954-1962:  expériences contrastées des hommes du contingent 
(Paris:  Autrement, 2000). 
 
24Martin S. Alexander, Martin Evans, and J. F. V. Keiger, eds., The Algerian War and the French Army: 
Experiences, Images, Testimonies (Houndsmills:  Palgrave, 2002). 
   
  8 
sadistic torturers and the FLN as savage terrorists.
25
  However, such studies are the 
exception rather than the rule in the literature.      
 Because of the paucity of works directly related to the combatants' postwar 
experiences and memory, this work must also turn to studies of the archetypal anciens 
combattants in France—veterans of the Great War.  To many of these older veterans, 
accustomed to an entirely different kind of warfare, it is quite possible that the war in 
Algeria did not seem a “real war.”26  Indeed, while there has been no large-scale French 
military involvement since Algeria, for most of the twentieth century, the veterans of the 
World Wars were highly visible in daily life as well as in the French historical 
imagination.27  A number of veterans from these two générations du feu established the 
historiography of the memory of the Great War.   
Jean Norton Cru gives us the foundational study of French soldiers' memory of 
the Great War in Du témoignage.28  Himself a veteran of the Great War, he argues that 
war is an "intellectually tangible experience" that can be studied scientifically, but limits 
the only valid témoins (witnesses) to those who were in combat.29  Drawing upon this 
work, Antoine Prost, an ancien d'Algérie, undertook the preeminent study of Great War 
veterans' participation in French society.  His book, In the Wake of War:  ‘Les anciens 
combattants’ and French Society, uses memoirs to trace how the cultivation of veterans' 
                                                 
25Alexander, Evans, and Keiger, 2. 
 
26Branche, “La dernière génération du feu?”, 6. 
 
27However, as Raphaëlle Branche points out, veterans of both Indochina and Algeria are now officially 
labelled “la troisième génération du feu,” which at least linguistically gives them equal recognition to 
veterans of the World Wars.  (Ibid., fn. 1.) 
 
28Jean Norton Cru, Du témoignage (Holland:  Jean-Jacques Pauvert, 1967). 
 
29Ibid., 27, 30. 
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memories helped shape their political organizations, finding that it took almost a decade 
for these veterans to begin publishing memoirs of their experiences.30  However, some of 
the memoirs in my study were published before the end of the Algerian War; the time 
frame for narrating one's war testimony collapsed significantly through the twentieth 
century.  Yet another veteran who studied the memory of the Great War, British World 
War II veteran Paul Fussell, made a foundational contribution to the field of memory 
studies in The Great War and Modern Memory.31  From a literary study of the prose, 
poetry, and memoirs of the Western Front, Fussell locates the origins of our "essentially 
ironic" modern sensibility in "the application of mind and memory to the events of the 
Great War."32  
 Bruno Cabanes' La victoire endeuillée:  la sortie de guerre des soldats français 
1918-1920 approaches the return of French World War I veterans from another angle:  it 
presents the dissonance between joyous narratives of the end of the war, and the reality of 
veterans' difficult wait to be demobilized and return home.33  Its emphasis on the fracture 
between the home front and the realities faced by the combatants is quite pertinent to the 
present analysis, as the anciens d'Algérie often found French society and their families 
unable or unwilling to understand their experience.34  Daniel Sherman's innovative work 
                                                 
30Antoine Prost, In the Wake of War: 'Les Anciens Combattants' and French Society, 1914-1939 (Berg: 
Oxford, 1992). 
 
31Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1975).  See also 
Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 1989). 
 
32Fussell, The Great War, 35. 
 
33Bruno Cabanes, La victoire endeuillée:  la sortie de guerre de soldats français 1918-1920 (Paris:  Seuil, 
2004). 
 
34For instance, Branche notes in her “Clémentines et bifteck” (op. cit.) that her interview with a former 
conscript was the first time he had spoken with anyone about the war (80). 
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The Construction of Memory in Interwar France (Chicago:  Chicago UP, 1999) traces the 
development of the collective memory of the Great War in France, in particular through 
commemorative rituals and monuments; it also establishes an alternative periodization of 
the emergence of this collective memory, which inspires the chronology I create to 
portray the development of the genre of veterans' memoirs of Algeria.    
   
THEORY AND METHOD 
 
 Both the analytical and narrative methods of this thesis closely parallel those 
employed by Leonard V. Smith in his The Embattled Self:  Soldiers' Testimony of the 
Great War.35  Beginning with a dialogue with Cru's Du témoignage, Smith uses literary 
analysis to locate the origins of the familiar Great War “metanarrative of tragedy,” 
expressed by Cru and Fussell among many others, in veterans' frustrated attempts to 
frame their inexpressible experiences in literature.36   Smith portrays the essential 
convergence of a narrative of the Great War, to the point that it became knowable even to 
non-combatants.  However, the present study finds that because of the ultimate 
fragmentation of the memory of Algeria, between strongly opposed political views in 
society and official silence on the part of the government, the only unified narrative that 
could be expressed by veterans to the public was one of betrayal and victimhood.  The 
reason that the Algerian War remains problematic as a topic of public or academic 
discussion in France today is indeed that there is no essential 'experience' to be 
                                                 
35Leonard V. Smith, The Embattled Self:  French Soldiers' Testimonies of the Great War (Ithaca:  Cornell 
UP, 2007). 
 
36Ibid., 9.  
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understood; it has been refracted among memory communities which often cannot 
communicate with each other because of vastly different frames of reference. 
 Philippe Carrard, in a study of memoirs written by Francophone volunteers in the 
SS during World War II, addresses a number of epistemological, theoretical and 
methodological concerns pertinent to my study.37  Carrard emphasizes the ambiguity of 
memoirs as historical documents, since when they were written is often unknown; for this 
reason, the truth-claims of memoirists must be seriously evaluated.38  Of most direct 
significance to the present study, Carrard analyzes the "textualization" of experiences into 
memoirs, emphasizing the disynchronicity between the "'now [...] at the time of writing," 
and "the thoughts that they assert they had 'then' [...]."39  My analysis will both closely 
consider how veterans textualized their experiences through the figure of the combatant, 
as well as the importance of disynchronicity in the narratives that they produced to 
address a contemporary audience.     
 My study includes memoirs published between the time of the war itself and 
1988.  This year marked a new era in veterans' memory of the war and its role in French 
public discourse.  In 1988, 50,000 veterans demonstrated in Paris to claim recognition of 
"their rights as former combatants of North Africa."40  It was clear that the state would 
not take a position on the war without "the pressure of public opinion" or interest 
groups.41  Thus the narrative of victimhood that developed in the genre of Algerian War 
                                                 
37Philippe Carrard, The French Who Fought For Hitler:  Memories from the Outcasts (Cambridge:  
Cambridge UP, 2010). 
 
38Ibid., 5, 8. 
 
39Ibid., 85, 110. 
 
40Branche, La guerre d'Algérie, 42. 
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memoirs could be seen breaking through into civil society in the year 1988; even the 
official naming of the war by the French National Assembly in 1999 "suggested the idea 
that these soldiers were, but perhaps also had been, victims."42   
 This thesis intentionally employs broadened definitions of the categories 
"memoir" and "combatant" in order to render apparent both the political diversity within 
the genre of Algerian War memoirs, and the great complexity of the combat itself, which 
involved not only conventional warfare and counterinsurgency, but also terrorism, 
psychological operations, and civilians engaged in a Franco-French civil war.  Paul 
Fussell defines the "memoir" in literary terms as "a kind of fiction," different from the 
"'first novel' [...] only by continuous implicit attestations of veracity or appeals to 
documented historical fact."43  Even Jean Norton Cru in his search for the strict empirical 
reality of war allowed in his sources a very broad definition of testimony:  "[...] all the 
memories of war under whatever form they appear, provided that they are personal 
memories and not borrowed from the real actors."44  Since I focus on veterans' memory 
and not the factual experiences of the war itself, the essential criterion I place on my 
sources is that they be reflections in prose published during or after the war by 
combatants describing their experience of the Algerian War.   
 In the interest of highlighting the diverse combat experiences of French actors in 
the Algerian War, I employ a broadened definition of 'combatant'.  Cru argues that 
"combatant" should be limited to those who experienced "exposure to danger" in the war, 
                                                                                                                                                 
41Branche, La guerre d'Algérie, 101. 
 
42Ibid., 103, original emphasis. 
 
43Fussell, The Great War, 310. 
 
44Cru, 33. 
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rather than merely the "bearing of arms."45  Drawing upon this distinction, I consider as 
combatants French citizens who were physically present in Algeria and participated in the 
diverse manifestations of fighting from 1954 to 1962.  Alongside memoirs written by 
French conscripts, officers, volunteers, and career soldiers, I will also include memoirs 
written by civilians who participated in combat, such as members of the OAS, and 
Gaullist counter-terrorist police troops (known as “barbouzes,” secret agents sent to fight 
the OAS).46  
 As for the selection of my sixteen sources themselves, within each historical stage 
I have identified in the construction of the memory of Algeria among veterans, I have 
sought to balance representativeness on three axes:  political opinions on the war (anti-
colonialist, pro-French Algeria, or ambiguous/indifferent), quality of military service 
(conscripts versus career soldiers, volunteers and officers), and origin (Metropolitan 
versus pieds noir).  However, the limits of my source base necessarily determine the 
narrative of the Algerian War that I derive from the genre of memoirs.   Claire Mauss-
Copeaux notes that pieds noirs, French officers, and OAS members have been vociferous 
in publishing their experiences, but that conscripts have remained largely silent:  "their 
few writings are most often self-published," or published by presses with very limited 
circulation.
47
  Indeed, in a bibliography of the Algerian War compiled by Benjamin Stora, 
out of the approximately 100 books that I was able to identify as veterans' testimonies, 
the overwhelming majority was written by mid-level or high-ranking officers as well as 
                                                 
45Cru, 33. 
 
46The Organisation de l'Armée Secrète, a pro-Algérie française paramilitary group operating in Algeria and 
the Metropole, was organized in spring 1961 by General Raoul Salan and Pierre Lagaillarde in reaction 
against upcoming negotiations with the FLN.  Stora, Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie, 58. 
 
47Mauss-Copeaux, 9. 
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pieds noirs.
48
  Attempting to counterbalance this quality of the sources, where my access 
permitted, I have tried to include outliers on all three axes of political tendency, military 
service, and origin.  However, as Leonard Smith and Philippe Carrard both concede about 
their sources, I cannot claim to have obtained a "representative sample" of the memoirs of 
the Algerian War, but with an understanding of both the general tendencies of the genre, 
as well as its outliers, this thesis nevertheless finds a persistent narrative of the Algerian 
War among the diverse group of veterans who felt compelled to publish their 
experiences.
49
                     
  This study reads memoirs within the narrative of silence and refoulement, 
identified by Benjamin Stora and others, and expands it to include the dialogue between 
veterans' competing understandings of the war, seeking the 'said' and the 'not-said' 
expressed through the figure of the combatant.  The method draws heavily on literary 
analysis:  regarding the memoirs as documents composed with a certain narrative voice, 
register, structure, and word choice, with certain details and themes included and 
excluded.  Rather than looking through these memoirs for the history of the Algerian war, 
as other historians have done, I look at the memoirs as documents presenting competing 
narratives of the war and views of the combatant, as the refoulement of the war's memory 
progressed.  Placing each memoir in dialogue with both the era when it was written and 
the events that it recounts is central to my analysis.  Raphaëlle Branche cautions that 
“self-justification is often present in [veterans' memoirs], even when it is presented as an 
analysis of the facts,” and this is certainly evident from even a cursory reading of my 
                                                 
48Benjamin Stora, Le dictionnaire des livres de la guerre d'Algérie:  romans, nouvelles, poésie, photos, 
histoire, essais, récits historiographiques, témoignages, biographies, mémoires, autobiographies:  
1955-1995 (Paris:  Harmattan, 1996). 
 
49Smith, 18, and Carrard, 5. 
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sources.50  I operate on the assumption that each memoir contains a project of self-
justification, overt or subtle, while expressing a personal and political message to a 
particular audience or audiences.  Moreover, as both Smith and Carrard note, soldiers in 
particular are "not prone to admitting their wrongs," especially when they are writing 
from the losing side of history, and this is an important consideration in my analysis of 
the political messages that veterans of Algeria convey through their depiction of the 
combatant.51 
 I use the term “memory community” to indicate particular groups of combatants 
who relate their memory through reference to a particular shared experience in the war.  
These communities were not necessarily coherent and self-conscious groups at the time 
of the experiences, but become stable and self-defining through the creation of narratives 
of memory after the fact.  Memory communities could, for instance, include naïve young 
Metropolitan conscripts, tough and indifferent paratroops, anti-colonialist war resisters, 
or unrepentant OAS members, provided that individuals' retrospective narrative of their 
experiences rely on describing themselves as part of these groups, which became better 
defined as the temporal distance from the war grew.  Moreover, these memory 
communities frequently overlap in the narrative of a single memoirist.   
 My use of the term memory community draws on Jan Assmann and John 
Czaplicka's critique of Maurice Halbwachs' “collective memory.”  Halbwachs' “collective 
memory” describes a body of memories through which certain groups define themselves, 
and which exists independent of any individual.  Without the “affective community” 
wherein “there are enough points of contact” between the individual and the group's 
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memory, the individual effectively ceases to belong to the group which defines itself 
through that memory.52  Assmann and Czaplicka's adaptation of this model is more useful 
in my analysis, however.  They point out that Halbwachs' collective memory remains 
within the bounds of “everyday communications,” and that his analysis ignores 
“objectivized culture,” including rituals, monuments, films, and texts.53  They argue that 
groups also self-consciously define and reproduce themselves through the “cultural 
memory” expressed in these external products, which have “the structure of memory” 
themselves.54  This theory is immensely helpful to my study, as I analyze memories 
concretized into texts, but I must modify it slightly, because I examine the cultural 
memory of competing memory communities within a society, and not of a society at large.  
A further clarification to the idea of memory communities also helps orient my study:  
Konrad Jarausch's description of certain groups' memories “competing [with other] 
recollections in the public realm, vying to have their version accepted as binding […]” 
aptly conveys the stakes of the French memory wars over Algeria, and the fragmentation 
of memory between different camps.55  
 My method examines the literary means through which veterans construct 
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themselves as veterans in their memoirs, and the political messages that they convey 
using this identity.  Foremost, I pose questions about the figure of the combatant in the 
text:  his political orientation, his identity within a memory community or lack thereof, 
his sense of what he is sent to do, and his sense of what is done to him as a soldier.  Next, 
I ask questions about the text itself: the effect of recent governmental amnesties of war 
crimes on the content the author feels compelled or able to convey, the balance of the said 
and the not-said.  Ultimately, I seek to uncover what 'lessons' of the war the veteran wants 
to teach his audience, through his constructed authority as a combatant.  Through putting 
these questions to the memoirs, as well as situating each within its historical context, I 
hope to contribute a more complex understanding of the limits of silence around the 
memory of the Algerian War.   
 Quoting Paul Ricoeur, Raphaëlle Branche emphasizes the layers of critical inquiry 
which historians must aim at memoirs as sources:  “'the perception of the lived 
experience, […] the retention of the memory, [… and] recovery of the characteristics of 
the event.'”56  My analysis will focus in particular on the latter two elements:  which 
aspects are retained and discarded or minimized in the memoir, and how they are 
presented in order to speak to the contemporary era and the intended audience.  The 
narrative that emerges from 1954-1989 in the genre of combatants' memoirs of the 
Algerian War is initially political and collective, but moves toward more personal, 
affective accounts; nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of memoirs surveyed portray 
the combatant as a victim in order to engage in debates with contemporary French 
society.  
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CHAPTER I 
“A SINGULAR MORAL EDUCATION”57 
 
 In the vanguard seeking to define the guerre d'Algérie and its anciens, memoirs 
written before the Accords of Évian of March 1962, needed to take a determined stance, 
frequently to justify their authors' crimes.  On the French negotiators' insistence, the first 
article of the Accords both gave amnesty to all who “participated or gave aid to the 
Algerian insurrection,” and to those who had committed “actions […] in the context of 
the operations to maintain order directed against the Algerian insurrection,” both of these 
on Algerian soil only.58  Therefore, veterans writing before de Gaulle's amnesty of the 
OAS and political criminals in 1968 had compelling reasons both to take principled 
stands, and to justify their behavior in the war based on these principles.  This section 
examines four memoirs that manifest the uncertain identity of the combatant early on:  
aggrieved not by the enemy, but by forces in the Metropole, he faces an untenable moral 
situation requiring unconventional and often illegal action.   
 The few memoirs published during this initial period all reflect their authors' 
strong political views on the war and collective views of wrongs done to French society; 
we find some of the most striking outliers in the whole genre in this era.  Jean-Louis 
Hurst, author of Le Deserteur, had vague orders from the Parti Communiste Français 
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(PCF) to work against the war; the edition house Éditions de Minuit gave Hurst 
immediate leftist and Resistance connotations in France.59 A socialist who had left the 
PCF, Robert Bonnaud in Itinéraire describes his political reflections on Algeria, subtly 
leading to his decision to aid the FLN.  These two memoirists are outliers in the genre 
because they were deserters, and because they wrote during the time of the war itself, 
both to justify their illegal actions and to galvanize opposition to the war.  A fierce 
partisan of l'Algérie française, pied noir businessman Joseph Ortiz describes in Mes 
combats:  carnets de route, 1954-1962 his role as an organizer of both the May 13, 1958 
putsch, and the “week of barricades” putsch in 1960.60  Lastly, Daniel Blanc's work, 
Après les armes, citoyens:  (la place du contingent dans la guerre d'Algérie et de la 
République), parodies the military genre “'Report on the morale of the troops,'” to defend 
the reputation of the maligned and neglected conscripts.61    In chronological order, we 
will examine how each author casts the figure of the combatant to justify their actions in 
the war or authorize their response to it.   
 From the beginning of his narrative, Jean-Louis Hurst sets himself apart as more 
politically discerning than the mass of French troops, which allows him to justify the 
individual decision he arrives at to desert and aid the FLN.  Hurst tries to engage his 
soldiers in political discussions, and is troubled by most conscripts' lack of interest in the 
politics of the war:  “[w]e touched on all subjects:  Brigitte Bardot, […] Cape Canaveral, 
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Fidel Castro, but the war, almost never.”62  Hurst notes that he tried to prevent his men 
from “playing the sadist,” but fears he was not effective enough.63    Hurst's failure to 
reach the majority of the men he leads compels him to seek more radical means to resist 
the war.  The memory community with which he aligns himself, and from which he 
receives absolution, is that of radical political exiles.  Speaking with a Spanish woman at 
an international camp for Europeans aiding the FLN, Hurst confesses his guilt at 
deserting; Juanita emphasizes that his struggles are nobler than those of the comrades he 
left behind, because they must only serve for twenty-eight months, while he might never 
return home.64  Hurst establishes himself as a combatant in a morally troubling war, with 
strong political ideals but very vague direction from the PCF, to explain his decision to 
desert and provide material support to the FLN in Algeria. 
 Robert Bonnaud sets himself apart more abstractly, as a voice of reason on the 
moral meaning of the war for France.  He was not a member of the PCF when he was 
conscripted, but he clearly intended to resist the war however he could, beginning with 
organizing demonstrations at the departure of his battalion.65  This memoir describes very 
few of Bonnaud's direct actions as a soldier.  Indeed, other soldiers are not mentioned at 
all except in discussions of atrocities.  For instance, “Periodically, the parachutists of 
Colonel Bigeard […] come to reinforce us […] The 'suspects' arrested in these operations 
are tortured […] then shot in a nearby ravine.”66   Bonnaud does, however, portray 
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himself as belonging to the memory community of metropolitan conscripts when he 
astutely observes that “Our luck […] is to witness the beginning of the Algerian War.”67  
Largely, however, Bonnaud separates himself from the mass of French conscripts (“these 
abandoned children”), while invoking them to convey his forceful message about the 
morality of the war, as we will see below.68  As combatants, Bonnaud and his comrades 
experience betrayal by Metropolitan politicians: their essential goal as soldiers “is to save 
our skin and to return to France to demand a reckoning from some people (including 
those who voted for certain special powers).”69  Bonnaud is silent on his decision to aid 
the FLN, but it is a foregone conclusion that he must fight against the “social fascism” of 
the colonial order.70    
 Joseph Ortiz constructs the most defiant combatant of all the memoirists in this 
period.  His narrative immediately justifies his combat to preserve l'Algérie française:  he 
was laying flowers on his father's grave in Oran when the FLN launched their 
insurrection on Toussaint, 1954.71  He also establishes his credentials as a French patriot 
because he had participated in Resistance activities in Algeria, preparing for the success 
of the Allies' Operation Torch in November 1942.72  As a combatant, Ortiz' mission is to 
defend French Algeria when the “aberrant politics” of de Gaulle have “plunged Algeria 
into chaos,” and the Euro-Algerians could no longer “have total confidence in the Army 
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[…].”73  Interestingly, Ortiz situates himself against the memory community of pieds 
noirs, at several points criticizing the European civilians in Algiers for refusing to “fully 
engage, leaving others to worry about saving you.”74  He identifies with exiled pied noir 
defenders of l’Algérie française, dedicating his memoir to “those who suffer, far from 
their native soil, because they committed the crime of wanting to remain French on a 
French territory.”75  He views himself as a combatant who was turned into a criminal by 
politicians and the Army, and abandoned by the civilian pieds noirs he sought to protect; 
his identity as a patriotic combatant who remained true to the Resistance spirit—when 
even de Gaulle betrayed it—justifies the putsch he launched in 1960 and for which he 
remained in exile while writing this book. 
 Daniel Blanc was a conscript but in his memoir, the combatant is a collective 
figure; writing in the unusual genre of a “report on the morale of the troops,” he aims to 
cultivate sympathy for the conscripts among civilians.  While Blanc notes that the 
conscripts never believed in the colonial “order which allowed a minority community to 
exploit and subjugate […] another community,” he also emphasizes their lack of concrete 
political understanding (“[...] they were barely twenty.  Politics bored them [...]”), which 
increases the pathos of their situation.76   Charged with preserving a colonial order in 
which they had no stake, their impossible mission left “on their lips the bitter taste of bad 
conscience and uselessness,” and “[a]ll their lives they will feel the blows” of this double 
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injury.77  The conscripts have been wronged by politicians and by a callous Metropole:  
robbed of their youth for a mission they did not believe in, now they must reintegrate into 
a society where “their fellow citizens ignore them” and enter a modernizing economy 
where “every undereducated man will be out of work.”78  The gravity of the conscripts' 
exploitation, and the challenges they face returning to society, justify Blanc's innovative 
use of a military genre to plead for civilian sympathy for the young veterans. 
 These memoirists frame the figure of the combatant in an unacceptable moral 
plight both in order to support their project of self-justification, and to convey the 
conditions leading 'naturally' to the lessons they derive from the war.  For Hurst, the 
reprehensible politics of the war lead him to make an individual choice to go beyond the 
law.  His desertion and aiding of the FLN are justified because he is in a “revolutionary 
party that fights colonialism,” and because he ultimately finds no possibility “to organize 
opposition movements among the conscripts.”79  Although he had left the PCF in 1956, 
Robert Bonnaud arrives at a similar conclusion with a stronger moral component.  He 
finds that the way France is prosecuting the war, with torture and summary executions, 
means that “France is a place without honor.”80  Moreover, he decries the “singular moral 
education” being given to “hundreds of thousands of child-citizens” in guerilla combat, 
and fears for the effects on the “national destiny” of the war.81  Because he believes there 
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is no way to bring the “French popular masses” to understand “colonial oppression and 
exploitation,” Bonnaud finds that the only way to resist the war is to aid the FLN, a 
decision for which he was imprisoned until the Accords of Evian.82    
 Joseph Ortiz, too, who would loathe to be compared to Bonnaud and Hurst, finds 
a strong moral justification for his political decisions.  Deeply regretful for having 
believed General de Gaulle's promise to create an Algeria of “'full-fledged Frenchmen'” 
[“français à part entière”], on June 4, 1958 in Algiers, Ortiz nevertheless takes 
satisfaction in the fact that he bears the true banner of the Resistance and is unrepentant 
of his involvement in two failed putsches.83    Finally, Daniel Blanc uses his authority as a 
combatant to denounce the exploitation by the French government and the indifference of 
society toward the conscripts, “who are now France, [but who] do not speak, do not 
reveal themselves.”84  Despite the extreme diversity of political opinion between these 
memoirists, all use the image of a combatant facing a morally impossible situation in 
order to convey a political message about collective wrongs incurred during the war.  
Surprisingly, even though Blanc was the only one of these authors who did not feel 
compelled to commit illegal actions, he conveys the strongest image of the combatant as 
the chief victim of the war, an image that will only strengthen in the genre over time. 
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Chapter II 
THE “BAD SHEPHERD”85 
 
 Paradoxically, De Gaulle's final amnesty of 31 July 1968—which released former 
OAS members in a bid for electoral success and to promote political reconciliation after 
the nation had almost been torn apart by “les évenements de mai”—negated one of the 
darkest phases of the Algerian War while rendering the struggle for the meaning of the 
war more public.86  With an upsurge of publications by high-ranking officers, memoirs 
published between 1968 and 1974 portray the figure of the combatant as the victim of 
hypocrisy, often to the point of questioning fundamental aspects of his identity.  General 
Jacques Pâris de Bollardière published Bataille d'Alger, bataille de l'homme in vehement 
protest of General Jacques Massu's La Vraie bataille d'Alger, which portrayed torture as 
instrumental to the French success in the Battle of Algiers.87  De Bollardière faced being 
fired from the Army when in 1957 he published an open letter denouncing torture; he 
ultimately quit after the generals' putsch in 1961, feeling that he could not continue in the 
Army and remain honorable.  Pierre Dominique Giacomoni, a pied noir civilian who 
claims to have been the top killer of the OAS, published J'ai tué pour rien to warn French
                                                 
85Colonel Antoine Argoud, La décandence, l'imposture, et la tragédie (Paris:  Fayard, 1974), ii. 
 
86Gacon, 286, 289, and Branche, La guerre d'Algérie, 30. 
 
87General Jacques Pâris de Bollardière, Bataille d’Alger, bataille de l’homme (Paris:  Desclée de Brouwer, 
1972). 
General Jacques Massu, La Vraie bataille d’Alger (Paris:  Plon, 1971). 
   
   26 
 youth about the dangers of racist hatred and atone for his actions, yet his work also 
denounces the hypocritical way the French government framed combat in the Algerian 
War.88  Finally, the putschist Colonel Antoine Argoud's La décadence, l'imposture, et la 
tragédie conveys the strongest portrait of a combatant betrayed by hypocrisy; Argoud's 
arch-enemy Charles de Gaulle failed French soldiers by giving them an impossible 
mission and repeatedly breaking his word.  Among these diverse memoirs, the figure of 
the combatant holds faithfully to his mission, failing because of the hypocrisy of the 
government, that of the Army, or both. 
 No veteran writing in this period defends himself as ardently as General Jacques 
Massu, seeking to dispel what he sees as lies and distortions in both Saadi Yacef's 
Souvenirs de la Bataille d'Alger, and Gillo Pontecorvo's 1967 film La bataille d'Alger.89  
Throughout his memoir, Massu portrays himself as a simple soldier who was forced by 
“Providence or Destiny” into making difficult political choices.90  Citing the widespread 
fear in Algiers of FLN terrorism—“savagery” against both Europeans and Algerians—
Massu's goal as head of the tenth division of colonial paratroops in the Battle of Algiers 
was to end terrorism and reestablish civilians' trust in France.91  Massu does not strongly 
align himself with any memory community, since he seeks to defend his reputation and 
portray his role as instrumental in the success of the Battle of Algiers.  He does, however, 
note that he fought for Free France against Vichy, and has a reputation among older 
officers for disobedience, but nevertheless emphasizes that he is a good soldier and would 
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accomplish any mission received.92  Accordingly, he firmly asserts the French victory in 
the Battle of Algiers, and defends the necessity and limited, unofficial use of torture in 
this mission, which was “dangerous” to the soldiers practicing it, but nevertheless not 
“degrading” to the subjects.93  As a combatant, he narrates a betrayal not by a higher 
military or political power, but by a hypocritical society that wanted terrorism in Algiers 
to end but did not want to acknowledge the means necessary to defeat it.            
 General de Bollardière depicts himself as a combatant with a strong human rights 
orientation.  He grounds this view in his formative experiences in the Resistance; charged 
with the interrogation of two German prisoners of war in 1942, he felt “shame” and 
“something like a holy fear,” and desisted from using torture on them.94  Indeed, having 
experienced torture as part of his initial training in the Resistance, de Bollardière 
concludes that it “degrades he who inflicts it even more than he who undergoes it.”95  De 
Bollardière seeks to correct misunderstandings among the French public, to whom torture 
was at first “denied with righteous indignation” and is now being justified by figures such 
as Massu.96  He does not align himself with any memory community, because his is the 
narrative of a principled outcast.  De Bollardière's loyalties are torn between what he 
perceives as the mission of the Army in Algeria—to win “even a provisional victory, no 
matter the price,” after the humiliations of the Occupation and Dien Bien Phu—and his 
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personal principles of “respect for the human being,” to never become like the Nazis.97  
In this narrative, the combatant is betrayed by the moral hypocrisy of the Army itself, 
where “justice became a blind force [...and] dialogue took the ignoble form of torture.”98   
 Pierre Giacomoni's book strongly reflects the disynchronous nature of all 
memoirs—the separation in time between the self who experiences and the self who 
recounts.  Although according to the publishers, he writes in the “desperate hope that no 
future adolescent” will succumb to such violence and hatred as he did, his narrative 
actually privileges his morally relativistic political views before his arrest in June 1962.  
The combatant in the narrative considers himself a soldier in the OAS, and denounces the 
hypocrisy of a judge who reproaches him for this comparison, asking  “And all the young 
metropolitan conscripts who came to make war […] it was for killing Arabs, wasn't it?  
Who sent them and for what motive?”99  Giacomoni's memory community is certainly 
that of the pieds noirs.  His best friend growing up was an Arab named Kader, and he 
vividly relates the experience of surviving a terrorist attack in a sports stadium in 
February 1957, emphasizing the effect the war is having on the children of Algeria, Arabs 
and Europeans:  “I have never forgotten the vision of this kid, victim of the folly of 
men.”100  Despite having little initial interest in politics, Giacomoni decided to join Pierre 
Lagaillarde in the “first pied noir army” during the week of barricades, “since my goal is 
to save l'Algérie française.”101  Throughout the memoir, Giacomoni details how his 
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participation in the OAS makes him “a monster,” and by the time of his capture, laments 
his “mutilated life, for a lost cause:  the OAS”102  While Giacomoni takes personal 
responsibility for his decisions and his moral fall, he also blame de Gaulle for deceiving 
and abandoning the pied noir people:  “[t]hey felt overwhelmed, betrayed by the one man 
in whom they had placed all their confidence.”103  Giacomoni was in fact amnestied by de 
Gaulle in 1968. 
 Colonel Antoine Argoud's denunciation of hypocrisy manifests the most skillful 
cognitive dissonance out of all the memoirs examined in this period; he attacks Charles 
de Gaulle as a traitor to the French government since June 1940, yet justifies his own 
participation in the generals' putsch of April 1961 in the name of honor and higher 
principles.  Argoud distinguishes himself from the ineffectual government and from other 
military leaders, including de Bollardière, whose “unending speculations on good and 
evil” and Gaullism both gall him.104  Positioning himself as an outsider, Argoud does not 
find a place within any memory community; “unconditional obedience” seems to him 
“incompatible with the dignity of a free man.”105  Argoud's mission was to fight against 
“revolutionary war”; he emphasized that for revolutionaries, war is total, and “[n]o moral 
consideration limits the use of force,” a fact which he reproaches other military leaders of 
forgetting.106  Furthermore, he sought to protect the indigenous population, faced with the 
“permanent threat of recourse to violence” by the FLN, while viewing them as dependent 
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on France to continue developing their land and society.107   These goals were betrayed 
by military leaders who proceeded as if fighting a classic war, and political leaders who 
seemed to have forgotten that “the Indochina war had ever taken place.”108  After the 
failure of the putsch in April 1961, Argoud took flight and was captured by “Gaullist 
barbouzes [secret agents]” in Munich; he takes this as a sign that he was one of de 
Gaulle's chief enemies.109  Unrepentant after his release from prison in July 1968, Argoud 
concludes that he has been betrayed by Gaullist hypocrisy, finds no honor in 
contemporary French society, and indeed pronounces his “shame at being French 
[…].”110   
 The combatant in these memoirs is a victim of hypocrisy on the part of the 
government, the military, or French society; such narratives often serve as a warning 
against dire futures that the author believes France will face.  General Jacques Massu 
juxtaposes gruesome eyewitness accounts of FLN mutilations in Algiers with the “very 
vague orders emanating from the government” to justify the ostensibly limited and 
unofficial use of torture, which led to a definitive success in the Battle of Algiers.111  In 
the time he is writing, however, French society remains “ungrateful” for this successful 
mission, due to the propaganda of the film La bataille d'Alger portraying the battle as the 
first step toward an FLN victory.112  General de Bollardière's narrative conveys that, from 
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its earliest stages, the war should have had a political solution; instead, the French 
government “hardly seemed to have learned any lessons from the war of Indochina,” and 
political leaders “installed themselves with fatalism in a chimerical war.”113  After 
discussing his resignation from the Army after the generals' putsch, de Bollardière 
criticizes both the Army and Gaullism:  he warns of the humiliation which faces “a 
country which […] risks gradually losing its soul and its liberty in a regime that no longer 
dares to defend itself against the menace of a rising totalitarianism.”114   
 Pierre Giacomoni also portrays the combatant as a victim of hypocrisy; the 
memoir concludes with a scene of young Giacomoni addressing the judge who arraigns 
him in 1962:  “The word 'war' would be too damning to attach it to the politics of our 
government […] 'Maintenance of order' allows for unsullied consciences and permits the 
absolution of many crimes.”115  Thus, Giacomoni relativizes his criminal actions in 
relation to those he perceives in the government and Army, in a book ostensibly written to 
atone for his crimes.  Colonel Antoine Argoud's narrative presents the most directly 
political narrative of betrayal by perfidious leaders; he portrays himself as a principled 
victim of the government's moral hypocrisy.  Imprisoned for treason himself, Argoud 
turns this accusation back upon the man who ordered his capture:  “[de Gaulle] has never 
ceased to affirm that the regime of Vichy was illegitimate, because he had betrayed it.”116  
In his view, the generals' putsch was justified because de Gaulle, a soldier who had “for 
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twenty years […] affirmed the existence of higher principles than the rules of military 
obedience,” had broken his word and failed to save l'Algérie française.117  Although these 
memoirs bear divergent messages about the meaning and the purpose of the Algerian 
conflict, their narratives all agree that Metropolitan forces have betrayed the combatant 
through amoral cynicism, and point to the loss of honor which now stains the country. 
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CHAPTER III 
“THIS CHAOTIC ALGERIA”118 
 
 Soon after his election in 1974, President Valéry Giscard-d'Estaing promulgated 
the first amnesty of the Algerian War since de Gaulle's death in 1970.  This largely 
"'symbolic reparation'” restored military decorations and legal fees to those convicted of 
crimes “'committed in relation with the events of Algeria.'”119  An important step in the 
legal whitewashing of the crimes and complexities of Algeria, this amnesty both returned 
to the fold of the Army, civilian and police administration, thousands of those who had 
lost their positions due to participation in the April 1961 putsch, and restored their 
decorations such as the Légion d'honneur.120  Symbolically, this amnesty opened the 
space for more direct criticism of the French government's management of the war 
because it cast both the Fifth Republic, and the generals' rebellion against it, in greater 
ambiguity.  The memoirs published in this era accordingly convey a sense of political 
disjuncture:  the combatant was a victim of a government which either failed to give him 
a clear political mission, or which cynically manipulated the military while deciding the 
outcome of the war well in advance of the Accords of Évian.
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  All memoirs surveyed from this period insist, with levels of military detail not 
seen in earlier memoirs, that the war was succeeding on the ground, but was either 
bungled or deliberately forfeited by de Gaulle and his government, and most convey a 
strong sense of regret or inevitability.  André Zeller, one of the putschist generals, wrote 
Dialogues avec un général to narrate the betrayal of the military by de Gaulle.121  
Although he would not be fully amnestied for the putsch until 1982, Zeller in 1974 is 
unrepentant for his actions and scathing in his criticism of de Gaulle, all the while relying 
on the narrative of honor before discipline, itself embedded in the Gaullist Resistance 
memory.  General Marcel Bigeard in Pour une parcelle de gloire narrates his many 
military successes counterpoised with a lack of guidance from the government, and a 
sense of inevitability about the outcome of the war.122  Bigeard led the 3rd regiment of 
colonial paratroops (RPC) under General Jacques Massu, and during the war had a public 
following rivaling that of Charles de Gaulle himself.  Pierre Hovette presents an unusual 
combatant's memoir in Capitaine en Algérie, a novelistic account of pacification very 
early in the war, which nevertheless can be taken as a fictionalized memoir of the 
experiences of this commander of the first and second companies of the 3rd RPC.  With 
great literary attention, Hovette narrates the painstaking process of pacification, village 
by village, against the backdrop of incoherent Metropolitan Algerian politics, which seem 
poised to undermine the soldiers' efforts from the beginning.  Jean-Marc Lavie, an Army 
pilot in the last stages of the war, provides the outlier for this group of memoirs.  His 
work Pour l'honneur speaks for the pied noir memory community and narrates his 
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experiences flying for the French Army before he crashed in 1961, while generally 
distancing himself from politics.123  Nevertheless, Lavie insists, as do the other authors in 
this period, that the war was being won militarily while the government showed its lack 
of faith in the military and negotiated with the enemy.  
 These narratives use the epistemological position of the combatant to oppose the 
military situation on the ground with the incoherence of French policy on Algeria.  As 
Army Chief of Staff, André Zeller is most removed from combat; nevertheless he 
portrays himself foremost as a soldier, hesitant to enter the intrigues and partisan politics 
of military administration.124  Indeed, from the beginning of Zeller's narrative, the 
government “preferred to play the politics of the ostrich,” ignoring the opinions of 
military leaders, and only doling out policy decisions “day-to-day.”125  As a soldier, 
Zeller's immediate military goal is “achieving peace under the sign of the French patrie;” 
only then can the “political and personal status of Algerians” be transformed to “wholly 
French [français à part entière]”.126  What is done to Zeller as a combatant is to be 
reduced, along with other military leaders, to the role of “message carrier” by de 
Gaulle.127  In the climactic scene of the whole narrative, Zeller tells de Gaulle before the 
referendum in 1958 that the officers feel they are on the verge of “definitively sav[ing] 
French Algeria,” and need reassurances as to the old general's intentions.  De Gaulle 
responds that “'Algerian politics is much more complex than you can imagine,'” 
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exclaiming three times, “'L'Algérie, c'est moi!'” and adding that “'The Army is an 
instrument. You hear me, an instrument!'”128  The accuracy of this striking account 
notwithstanding, it conveys Zeller's sense that de Gaulle had decided the fate of Algeria 
well in advance.  Zeller adds that it was not so much the future of Algeria that concerned 
him, but the soldiers and officers “who would continue to […] kill and be killed with 
false ideas—or without any idea at all—of the goal [...].”129  Traitors and heroes are both 
defined through the “see-saw game of History,” but in light of the fact that the Army had 
“total success in sight” when de Gaulle took irrevocable steps toward Algerian 
decolonization, Zeller justifies his orchestration of the 1961 putsch as a defense of 
military honor and duty, which sometimes must come before discipline.130       
 Without the scathing political commentary of Zeller, General Marcel Bigeard 
portrays himself as a successful soldier who ends up the scapegoat of a government 
unwilling to provide its military with a clearly defined mission, in a war which was 
winnable from the beginning.  Bigeard is unusual among these memoirists in that he 
considers the Algerian War “ersatz”; he repeatedly emphasizes France's overwhelming 
superiority in materiel and manpower over the FLN.131  He defines himself as a 
combatant in terms of his own successes—both in reforming his regiment, and his rapid 
promotions and rise to celebrity status in France—as well as through descriptions of the 
“courage and tenacity” of his adversary.132  A veteran of Dien Bien Phu and former 
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prisoner of the Viet Minh, Bigeard fights resolved to “not see Algeria fall under a regime 
like that which I knew in captivity.”133  Despite this memory, he describes his mission in 
strictly military terms:  to create “a magnificent instrument of combat which must 
become invincible and win without losses.”134  Repeatedly, he emphasizes that he is “a 
soldier, not attempting to play any political role,” yet bemoans the government's 
consistent failure to give the military “clear and well-defined missions.”135  He insists that 
the French soldiers, if properly “oriented, helped, supported, would have an ideal greater 
than that of the adversary,” but even after making such an appeal to President de Gaulle, 
Bigeard is not convinced that the government takes this problem seriously.136  Bigeard 
emphasizes that the fellagha “were not the Viets,” and with the support of the 
government, “[w]e could have won this conflict, militarily at least, very quickly.”137  
What is done to Bigeard as a combatant is his ignominious fall from favor due to military 
politics; in a larger sense, however, what is done to him is the reduction of his military 
successes by the course of history, which demanded that France “abandon” Algeria:  “[...] 
I have largely fought for nothing.”138  
 Despite lacking a rapid ascent and fall from glory, Pierre Hovette conveys the 
most subtly tragic narrative of a combatant's ardent efforts doomed by the incoherence of 
Metropolitan politics.  The captain in Hovette's narrative is engaged in the slow work of 
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pacification in 1955, negotiating submission of arms for French material support to 
remote villages in Little Kabylia; his goal is to “reaffirm French sovereignty” in a zone 
long devoid of any French presence.139  Discussing the double role of soldiering and 
diplomacy given his company, Hovette strongly places himself in the memory 
community of the paras:  “It was up to us to show […] that the paras can succeed at 
things other than war!”140  Hovette's captain emphasizes the sacred duty the French 
soldiers have to protect Algerians, especially in light of the “haunt[ing]” nature of the 
paras' memory of Indochina.141  Hovette elides what they are haunted by, but it is clearly 
the abandonment of civilians in a French colony the military had sworn to protect.  
Hovette portrays himself as a soldier of peace, citing an Arabic proverb “Peace is in the 
shadow of the spear” on the title page, and arguing against the “strong and hard” tactics 
urged by his comrades with the reminder that  “[b]lood only calls for more blood.”142  
Political criticism remains vague in Hovette's narrative, yet he dismisses Metropolitan 
French Algerian politics as “so many years of incoherence,” and at one point he wonders 
whether the government's constant rearrangement of various units in the field is the result 
of “more stupidity, or sabotage.”143  Hovette's narrative ends with a personal success, a 
dramatic scene where he visits the house of the President of a village unarmed, to show 
good faith and negotiate the final collection of arms; while such feats “satisfy [his...] 
pride,” he retains serious doubts about the long-term value of such actions “in this chaotic 
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Algeria.”144   
   Among these authors, Jean-Marc Lavie is the only physical victim of this war, 
almost meeting his end in a plane crash; while his memoir does not engage politics very 
directly, he hints that the French government was playing a double game with the enemy, 
which rendered sacrifices such as his worthless.  Although Lavie frames his narrative 
with the mise en abyme of his plane crash, he surprisingly does not dwell bitterly on the 
experience itself:  “This was the end of my existence as a war pilot and the beginning of 
another [...with] a new spirit, a man whose former thoughts were washed away by 
fire.”145  He depicts himself as a youthful pied noir eager to prove himself to the 
Metropolitans in the Army; several times he refers to the collective identity of “[a]ll of us, 
the French of Algeria, we are but one, despite our diverse origins [...]”146  Moreover, his 
political opinions on the war come directly from the pied noir collective memory:  France 
“liberated” Algerians from the Turks, and gave value to the land in a way that the Arabs 
never could.147  As a war pilot, Lavie's mission is to “uncover Arab terrorists,” but he also 
notes that the more important “non official struggle” is to keep attentiste Arabs neutral 
and “allow the French Army to solve the problem.”148  Lavie uses his plane crash to 
portray soldiers in general as victims of the Fifth Republic's machinations: “our combat 
and the sacrifices that it led to had no sense,” because the soldiers were ignorant of the 
government's negotiations with the FLN, which would "[obliterate] our success on the 
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ground.”149  While presenting this indirect collective political criticism, the vast majority 
of the memoir merely recounts Lavie's personal career as a pilot; his memoir strongly 
reflects the trend of personalization of the memory of the Algerian War that will only 
increase in the next decade. 
 Through balancing the visible potential of military success with a sense of 
sacrifice in vain, these combatant figures all bear the message that the war was lost either 
through political mismanagement or cynical manipulation of the military.  André Zeller 
bemoans the lack of a trusting relationship between civil and military powers, which was 
“the essential cause of our current losses.”150  Zeller justifies his step outside of legality in 
the April putsch in light of how even “the highest official put himself outside of the 
rules;” de Gaulle reduced the Army to the “mute intermediaries” of a “secret politics,” 
and therefore “made [us generals] into rebels.”151  Marcel Bigeard considers that the 
Algerian War should have been easier to win than the Indochina War, but was similarly 
bungled through “lying from all echelons.”152  The war was lost both because the 
government did not take it seriously, and because of political “backtracking” resulting 
from false electoral promises.153  With an even more intimate sense of the disjuncture of 
political and military goals in Algeria, Pierre Hovette describes his efforts to win over the 
hearts and minds of Algerian civilians despite his soldiers' lack of a clear understanding 
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of the “politics of France.”154  Indeed, because of distant Metropolitan “partisan interests 
without any concession […] to the common interest,” Hovette senses that ultimately, 
France will have “nothing to brag about.”155  Finally, Jean-Marc Lavie juxtaposes the 
brutal escalation of combat from 1954 to 1961 with the government's obstinate refusal to 
use the word “war.”156  As the only direct physical victim of the war from among these 
memoirists, Lavie questions the value of his sacrifice, since the French government was 
undermining a successful military effort with “secret negotiations with our 
adversaries.”157  In this stage of the development of Algerian War memoirs, the personal 
is certainly gaining dominance over the political, yet the figure of the combatant still 
remains a victim, this time of an inept or duplicitous Metropolitan government.         
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CHAPTER IV 
“A FULL-FLEDGED BARBARIAN”158 
 
 The final step in the negation of crimes of the Algerian War—President François 
Mitterrand's rehabilitation of sanctioned Army members, including the putschist 
generals—manifests in memoirs after 1981.159   With a sharp turn away from the 
polemics of earlier periods, these authors depict the combatant as pathetic or bitter, and 
resigned to violence; this was also the first period when sarcasm and humor became  
conceivable narrative tools.  Without the need to justify crimes that no longer existed, 
veterans, often rank-and-file conscripts or volunteers, personalized the war, describing 
how combat affected them, or decrying the official history leveled against them.  Lucien 
Bitterlin wrote Nous étions tous des terroristes:  histoire des “barbouzes” contre l'O.A.S. 
en Algérie to set the record straight on the Gaullist secret police.160  Civilian activists in 
the Mouvement pour la communauté en Algérie (MPC) initially sought an associationist 
consensus in Algeria, but became counter-terrorist agents in the franco-French civil war 
with the OAS.  Jean-Pierre Hutin, a volunteer paratrooper from a Metropolitan military 
family, wrote Profession:  j'aime pas la guerre, an unrepentant testament with some
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bitingly sarcastic political commentary.  Jean Forrestier was a conscript and served in the 
Light Infantry (chasseurs à pied), then the colonial paratroopers; his memoir Une gueule 
cassée en Algérie describes how combat has personally affected him, with minimal 
political commentary.161  Finally, Resistance and Indochina veteran General Jacques 
Bourry's Itinéraire de soldat is an outlier; this strongly polemical work was written to 
lament Gaullist deception, and to argue against the rising trend of colonial repentance in 
French society.162  As a rule, however, the genre in this period foregrounds individual 
testimony, and political commentary recedes to become a more personal matter. 
 Lucien Bitterlin's memoir exemplifies the embrace of violence in the literature in 
this period.  Bitterlin asserts that his violence was a matter of “political engagement.”163  
A civilian Gaullist activist, he joined the MPC initially to forge a “rapprochement 
between liberal, Gaullist, and undecided Europeans, and nationalist liberal Muslims.”164  
Bitterlin blames the pieds noirs for refusing to negotiate with the FLN, who had been 
making overtures since 1956.165  With OAS attacks increasing and the local police 
unwilling to fire on fellow Europeans, the MPC took up arms.  Bitterlin hesitates to 
discuss his own acts of violence directly, yet does describe the kidnapping, interrogation, 
and subsequent release of OAS members “without resorting to electric torture [la 
gégène],” and reports “vigorously” disapproving of civilian terrorist bombings attempted 
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by a colleague.166  Bitterlin views himself as the spokesman for the embattled memory 
community of Gaullists in the MPC, derided as barbouzes by the OAS and described as 
“'professional killers'” by the press and history books after the war's end.167  Indeed, 
Bitterlin uses the word “terrorists” in the title to “[...] demonstrate that terrorism can be a 
synonym for resistance and can be a legitimate act, or at least understandable, if not 
always permissible.”168  This framing equates his resistance with that of the FLN.  What 
has been done to Bitterlin as a combatant is abandonment by those whom he considered 
allies, even other Gaullists.  It was not until 1982 that the MPC was recognized by a 
parliamentary commission for its combat against the OAS.169     
    Jean-Pierre Hutin's humorous and unrepentant memoir illustrates the distance 
between the government and the combatant, and the wounds that the war inflicted upon 
the soldier's soul.  The scion of a military family who looked forward to Algeria as 'his' 
war, Hutin conveys the paradoxes of his life with a pun in the title:  “I profess/Profession:  
I don't like war.”  Throughout the narrative, he repeats the line “I was stupid.  I didn't 
know [...]” to explain his willingness to fight for a cause he did not understand.170  Hutin 
identifies strongly with the memory community of paratroopers, describing them as 
“leopards” and often speaking in the first person plural.  Hutin is clear about his mission 
on a military level:  his company of paratroopers must stop the FLN in Algiers from 
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“killing, mutilating children, women, Muslims.”171  However, he seems unconcerned with 
ideology or nationalism; Hutin at numerous points compares the “leopards” in his 
regiment with the “fels” of the FLN, and in one spectacular fantasy, describes how they 
could fight side by side to “liquidate the Pied Noirs, the intellectual Arabs, our deputies, 
theirs, just like that […].”172  Hutin elides what he does as a combatant, but it is 
intimately tied to what is done to him.  In a description of the paratroopers' mission in 
Algiers, he states that “[t]orture is a choice which humanely, no one has the right to use.  
If you make this choice, you must accept to lose your soul.”173  Because “la belle France 
dealt us the blow of indifference,” the soldier who is expected to become “a full-fledged 
barbarian,” who loses his soul, is the real victim of the war.174       
 Jean Forrestier also portrays the combatant as a victim of the war, employing 
pathos in a way that results in far less direct political commentary.  Forrestier receives 
high praise in the preface by General Marcel Bigeard, under whom he fought in the battle 
of Algiers; the narrative is almost completely silent on politics.  Like Hutin, Forrestier 
relates his mission in routine military rather than ideological terms, only once putting 
extra quotation marks around the term “'pacification,'” perhaps to question the feasibility 
of the paratroopers' mission.175  He seems less strongly attached to the memory 
community of paratroopers, usually speaking in the first person singular; instead, his 
memory community is that of wounded veterans.  He describes his actions more directly, 
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for instance admitting that he was afraid in a close encounter with an enemy soldier, but 
shot him anyway, and confessing that he struck an enemy prisoner over the head with a 
rock but felt ashamed afterward.176  This combatant is resigned to excesses of violence by 
his comrades; Forrestier saw no point intervening when a group of paratroopers beat 
down an Arab veteran of Indochina and World War II (“And another one won over to our 
cause!”):  such events happen frequently, and “what is the use playing the moralist in 
front of my brothers-in-arms?”177  What is done to Forrestier is largely framed as 
personal, with no direct political dimensions:  he is disfigured by close fire, becoming a 
gueule cassée ("broken face", a term recalling veterans with facial wounds from the Great 
War).  Forrestier laments that a generation of “mutilated” and “hateful” veterans now 
wonder, “for whom, for what [were] we fighting?”, but never goes as far as direct 
criticism of the war or its handling.178   
 Similar to the memoirs of other high officials and generals, which "seem to 
manifest a kind of refusal of history," Jacques Bourry's memoir depicts a patriotic 
combatant forced to abandon his duty because of governmental betrayal.179  
Characteristic to this period, however, Bourry makes heavy use of pathos.  Bourry's 
memory communities are those of career soldiers, and of resentful Algérie française 
partisans who consider that the defeat was for “solely political reasons,” when it could 
have been won militarily.180  Bourry describes his direct actions as a combatant very 
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sparsely, but he does detail his attempts to help undertake de Gaulle's Constantine Plan.  
What is done to Bourry as an honorable combatant is linked to his political message:  it is 
natural for a soldier who “receives the order to abandon everything” for “solely political 
reasons” to feel “that he has fought for a cause foreign to his country.”181  It is the pathos 
in Bourry's narrative that makes this a personal rather than a collective wrong.  Bourry 
gives a human face to de Gaulle's “politics of abandonment” when he describes personal 
encounters with “Muslims” asking the French Army to stay and protect them from the 
FLN, and wonders what will be the lot of “miserably poor” pieds noirs with no ties to the 
Metropole.182 
 Appearing within a political context where the crimes of the Algerian War had 
been largely effaced, memoirs written after the final amnesties more often portray the 
combatant as a personal victim of violence or a pathetic situation rather than of political 
betrayal.  Lucien Bitterlin alone can claim victory, although the MPC was the victim of 
derision by the press for decades.  He was on the winning side of history with de Gaulle; 
their common mission was to obtain a cease-fire, which the FLN leaders asked for when 
they saw “French civilians [with the government's backing] participat[ing] in the struggle 
[…] against the OAS.”183  Bitterlin's narrative relies on comparing the MPC to the 
Resistance—describing de Gaulle as “the head of the French terrorists” in World War 
II.184  For Jean-Pierre Hutin, however, the war “was lost from the beginning” on a 
military level, since the government considered politics “'way over [the paratroopers'] 
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heads.'”185  Although Hutin presents himself as a victim of the political exigencies 
requiring that he become a torturer and lose his soul, he concludes with a defiant “JE NE 
REGRETTE RIEN,” signifying a personal rather than a political triumph.186  Jean 
Forrestier presents the strongest image of the combatant as pathetic; during his 
evacuation after being disfigured in combat, he chants, “I am twenty years old, I don't 
want to die.”187  The closest he comes to political criticism is lamenting the physical and 
psychic mutilation of his cohort, who never “knew the ideal, the faith of the FLN 
combatants.”188  General Jacques Bourry, on the losing side of history, narrates his 
political victimhood; the military was deceived by Charles de Gaulle, who was planning 
the “abandonment” of Algeria as early as May 13, 1958.189  Bourry concedes that 
decolonization might have been inevitable, but that it could have been undertaken in a 
more honorable and “less brutal manner,” without abandoning “French Muslims” to the 
“genocide” of the FLN.190  Because they write in an era that no longer requires strident 
political stances to justify their decisions during the war, and because of their 
irreconcilable views on decolonization, all that is left for these memoirists to agree on is 
the victimhood of the French combatant and the pathos of the Algerian experience.
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CONCLUSION 
 
 This study of the genre of French veterans' memoirs of Algeria both confirms 
Benjamin Stora's thesis of the repression of the war's memory, and expands on Stéphane 
Gacon's explanation of the effects of Gaullist amnesties of war crimes.  The impossibility 
of a collective narrative of the Algerian war in French society as a whole did not arise ex 
nihilo, nor was it inevitable.  It resulted from the continued official refusal to 
acknowledge the war as a war, the gradual erasure of crimes during the war through 
presidential amnesties, the misdirection of commemorative attention toward the myth of 
the Resistance, and the gradual channeling of debates about the war into different 
memory communities incapable of dialogue with each other or with society at large.   
 The veterans who wrote memoirs in this climate did arrive at some accord about 
the nature of their Algerian experience, despite their disagreement about its meaning.  
Following Leonard Smith's model, I have sought to unearth the narrative of the Algerian 
War emerging from the genre of veterans' memoirs.  Between the war itself and 1988, the 
vision of the “embattled self,” as expressed by combatants as diverse as conscripts, elite 
paratroopers, four-star generals, OAS members, and Gaullist secret police, was initially 
political and collective, but became more personal and affective; nevertheless, it is a
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narrative of victimhood throughout.  The combatant is first the victim of an untenable 
moral situation, then of moral hypocrisy, then of political miscalculation or manipulation, 
and finally he is a personal victim of wounds from the war, or of being forgotten by 
History.  
 During and immediately after the war, when the ideological and juridical stakes 
over the meaning of the war were the highest, the figure of the combatant is in an 
impossible moral situation, which justifies either illegal action, or a plea to society for 
understanding.  The narrative at this point is of political betrayal.  After de Gaulle's final 
amnesty in 1968 and the period of political and social upheaval leading up to it, the 
combatant becomes the victim of moral hypocrisy, sometimes to the point of questioning 
his own identity, and the narrative often foreshadows a grave future for France.  After the 
symbolic restitution in 1974, the figure of the combatant senses his sacrifices have been 
in vain, because of political ineptitude and indifference, or calculated misdirection of the 
military.  Finally, after the last war amnesty in 1981, the figure of the combatant emerges 
as distinctly apolitical; aside from chagrinned high-ranking officers and the nostalgiques 
of l'Algérie française, political commentary seems merely a side-note or source of one-
liners.  The narrative now is that of individual victimhood—being forced to abandon 
one's duty, having one's contributions forgotten by History, or the physical and psychic 
wounds incurred during the war.  Because of the erasure of criminal status of the darkest 
aspects of the Algerian War, the resultant lack of need for strong political justification for 
one's views on the war, and the general public and official indifference toward the subject 
of the war for decades, the only common thread that could remain in the genre of 
veterans' memoirs in this period is personal victimhood.   
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 And it is arguably this sense of personal victimhood and abandonment that fueled 
numerous movements for recognition and commemoration of veterans of the Algerian 
War.  While the combatants who felt compelled to recount their experiences in memoirs 
may not be representative of the population of French veterans of Algeria as a whole, the 
narrative of victimhood and betrayal apparent from this study offers an intriguing 
question to test in future research.  If many veterans of this war conceived of themselves 
foremost as victims, how did that affect their integration and identity within a society 
which would not even recognize their war until the turn of the twenty-first century?          
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